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Abstract—It is challenging to assess the vulnerability of a
cyber-physical power system to data attacks. In order to support
vulnerability assessment, with the exception of analytic methods,
a suitable platform for security tests needs to be developed. In
this paper we analyze the cyber security of energy management
system (EMS) against data attacks. First we extend our ana-
lytic framework that characterizes data attacks as optimization
problems with the objectives specified as security metrics and
constraints corresponding to the communication network prop-
erties. Second, we build a platform in the form of co-simulation -
coupling the power system simulator DIgSILENT PowerFactory
with communication network simulator OMNeT++, and Matlab
for EMS applications (state estimation, optimal power flow). Then
the framework is used to conduct attack simulations on the co-
simulation based platform for a power grid test case. The results
indicate how vulnerable of EMS to data attacks and how co-
simulation can help assess vulnerability.
I. INTRODUCTION
Cyber security vulnerabilities within the information and
communication technology (ICT) infrastructure may allow
attackers to manipulate the physical system, communication
network or software applications in the cyber-physical power
system. As a real example of cyber attack reported recently,
highly destructive malware corrupted automation systems in
substations resulting in a large scale blackout in the Ukrainian
power grid [1]. Modern energy management systems (EMS)
combined with Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition
(SCADA) networks provide support for the monitoring and
control of power grids. However, this critical infrastructure
is vulnerable to cyber attacks and several attack events have
been reported, see [2], [3]. In order to increase the security of
these systems, one needs analytic methods to first understand
the vulnerabilities and then to validate or explore them with
appropriate tools. Some of the literature has already tackled
these problems. Vulnerability assessment methods mainly us-
ing analytic expressions have been proposed in [4]–[6]. Some
tools based on co-simulation techniques to integrate simulated
power systems, communication network and controls have
been developed to analyze the behavior of cyber-physical
power systems including cyber security issues [7]–[9].
However, these two parts of the work are usually conducted
independently even though they are related. Analytic methods
may have to ignore some details when modeling the hetero-
geneous cyber-physical system, but could be used to guide
the cyber security tests on co-simulation tools, while the tools
can support the security analysis with empirical results. This
could contribute to develop more robust algorithms/methods
that combine system-theoretic and ICT-specific measures to
protect EMS against data attacks [10]. In this paper, we aim to
contribute in closing this gap by extending the typical vulner-
ability assessment framework to incorporate communication
network properties and developing a co-simulation platform
to conduct simulations on data attacks against EMS. In order
to achieve this, some communication network properties are
modeled in the analytic vulnerability assessment framework.
Additionally, experiments are conducted on the developed co-
simulation platform and the simulation results are analyzed.
The outline of the paper is as follows. Section II details
the problem statement and our motivations on developing the
methods and tools. In Section III, the analytic vulnerability
assessment framework is illustrated. We further analyze what
communication network properties should be considered in
order to extend the framework. The co-simulation platform is
presented in detail in Section IV, including how the power
system and communication network are modeled, how the
tools are integrated and how the attacks are implemented
in OMNeT++. Section V shows the empirical results from
co-simulation. We also provide a discussion on combining
system-theoretic and ICT-specific measures to protect EMS.
The conclusion remarks are in Section VI.
II. PROBLEM STATEMENT AND MOTIVATION
A. Data Attacks Against Energy Management System
The SCADA system supports the EMS of the information
delivery as indicated in Figure 1. As a core part of EMS,
State Estimation (SE) provides the operator an estimate of
the state of the electric power system. SE uses measurements
collected by the Remote Terminal Units (RTUs) in substations
and transmitted through the SCADA communication network
to the Master Terminal Units (MTUs) in the control center.
The estimated state information is then processed by other
applications in EMS such as optimal power flow (OPF) and
Contingency Analysis (CA) to compute optimal control action
while ensuring reliability and safety. The critical nature of
EMS highlights the importance of making it accurate and
secure for power grid operations.
However, as SCADA systems become more connected to
the Internet and corporate networks, they are potentially vul-
ar
X
iv
:1
70
8.
08
32
2v
1 
 [c
s.C
R]
  2
8 A
ug
 20
17
RTUs Power Network RTUs
S
C
A
D
A
 m
as
te
r
S
ta
te
 E
st
im
at
io
n
Optimal Power Flow
Contingency Analysis
Bad Data Detection
...O
p
er
at
o
r
S
C
A
D
A
 m
as
te
r
Pi, Pij, Vi, δi  
Energy Management System
A1
A2
A3
Communication 
Network
Communication 
Network
Figure 1. A schematic block diagram of the power network, SCADA system
and EMS. The SE uses power flow (Pi, Pi j) measurements (zi) collected by
RTUs and transmitted by the SCADA system to estimate the current state (δi)
of the power network. An alarm is triggered by the Bad Data Detection (BDD)
when the norm of the measurement residual r exceeds a given threshold. The
cyber attack can manipulate the measurements by directly tampering the RTUs
(A1), the SCADA communication network (A2) or even the SCADA master
(A3). Figure adapted from [11].
nerable to a large number of security threats. This is one moti-
vation of our work. Substations need remote access connection
for monitoring and maintenance, which may expose them
to cyber attacks. Besides, for most industrial communication
protocols, e.g., DNP 3.0, IEC 61850, adequate cyber security
features were not always included at the time of publishing
[12]. As shown in Figure 1, the manipulation of measurements
can arise from various levels (A1, A2, A3).
B. Towards Cyber-Secure and Resilient State Estimation
Assuming that the power system has n+1 buses, the typical
state estimation technique solves the following problem under
DC power flow model,
z = Hx+ e, (1)
where the vector z denotes the m measurements, H ∈ Rm×n
represents the system model that describes the dependencies
of measurements and system state, x ∈ Rn is the state vector
of n bus phase angles except the reference one, e is the
measurement noise vector which is always assumed to have
a Gaussian distribution of zero mean and covariance matrix
R = diag(σ21 , . . . ,σ
2
m). For such a large-scale SCADA system,
lost data, inaccurate measurements and failing RTUs or other
infrastructures in communication network are common [11].
Thus there is a built-in Bad Data Detection (BDD) scheme
to deal with that. In BDD, the residual signal r is evaluated
to detect and locate existing anomalies of data, as depicted in
Figure 1. However, such kind of system-theoretic measure is
not adequate to protect the EMS against potential data attacks.
The data can be corrupted in a coordinated way that still fulfills
the power flow laws and would not be detected by BDD [13].
A considerable amount of work has been done on vul-
nerability assessment of data attacks against EMS [4]–[6],
[14], [15]. Usually these are system-theoretic measures that
are based on analytic methods. Another group of measures
from ICT-specific security includes firewalls, network in-
trusion detection systems and authentication, etc. Recently
some organizations (e.g. NIST, NERC) have proposed security
standards that combine the measures from ICT-specific and
system-theoretic ones [10]. Regarding these issues, we have
the following recommendations:
• The system-theoretic measures based on analytic methods
need empirical results for validation and analysis;
• The vulnerability assessment of data attacks should take
the attack impact/consequences into account;
• To improve the security of EMS, there is a necessity
to explore the interactions between system-theoretic and
ICT-specific measures and try to combine them.
To support the security analysis above, an integrated plat-
from using various tools including simulators for power net-
work, SCADA communication network and EMS applications
could offer these capabilities. Co-simulation is currently one
of the most popular methods to analyze such a large, heteroge-
neous cyber-physical system [16]. Therefore in this paper we
propose to extend our current analytic vulnerability assessment
methods to incorporate communication network properties and
enable them with support from a co-simulation platform.
III. ANALYTIC FRAMEWORK INCORPORATING
COMMUNICATION NETWORK PROPERTIES
A. Data Attacks and Vulnerability Assessment Problem
With the goal of perturbing the SE and further corrupting
the applications in EMS, the attacker would gain access to
the measurement data through various levels (A1, A2, A3) as
shown in Figure 1. The measurements under different attack
scenarios from the view of SE can be presented as follows:
• Data integrity attack - also known as false data injection
(FDI) attack, is able to change measurements values from
z to z+a where a is the FDI attack vector.
• Data availability attack - includes DoS or jamming attack
which would make specific measurements unavailable to
SE, i.e., z0 = (I − diag(d))z where d ∈ {0,1}m is the
availability attack vector and I is an identity matrix.
• Combined attack - combines the FDI and availability
attack that makes the measurements from z to (I −
diag(d))z+a corrupted by a and d.
The vulnerability assessment is presented through the notion
of security metric which computes how many measurements
need to be manipulated by the attacker to keep stealth against
the BDD. This metric can quantify the attack resources and
consequently the vulnerabilities of EMS to attacks. The EMS
is more vulnerable to attacks with small security metric since
such attack needs less resources to be executed. Taking the
attack scenarios under DC model as an example, if the attacker
corrupts certain measurements using FDI attack vector a=Hc,
it can remain hidden from the BDD but perturb the current
state to a degree of c [13]. It’s also shown in our recent work
[6] that combined attacks can achieve the same target with the
attack vector a= (I−diag(d))Hc. It should be noted that these
data attacks are assumed not to make the system unobservable.
In sight of this, it is natural to consider the following security
metric problem:
α j := min
c,d
‖a‖0+‖d‖0
s.t. a = H0c, (2a)
H0 = (I−diag(d))H, (2b)
a( j) = µ, (2c)
d(i) ∈ {0,1} for all i,
where ‖a‖0 and ‖d‖0 denote the number of non-zero element
in the vectors. Here µ is a non-zero value denoting the attack
magnitude on measurement j, and α j is the security metric
that can illustrate how many measurements or RTUs needed
by the attacker to corrupt EMS and keep stealth.
B. Analytic Vulnerability Assessment Incorporating Commu-
nication Network Properties
The vulnerability assessment problem in (2) suits for the
cases that attacks arise from the level of A1 in Figure 1. This
security metric directly shows that manipulation on several
RTUs is needed for the attacker. However in practice, tamper-
ing with RTUs directly becomes much harder as more RTUs
are authenticated and secured. A more interesting scenario
is to look into attacks from the level of A2 since usually
attacks would explore vulnerabilities in communication net-
works, e.g., compromising remote access points, obtaining
access to corporate networks. The vulnerability assessment
should consider the communication network. However, mod-
eling the communication network in an analytic framework
is challenging due to its complexity and heterogeneity. Here,
the communication network properties of interest for security
analysis are as follows:
• Communication topology;
• Routing schemes - the routing paths of packets / data;
• Communication latency - how the packets / data would
be delayed in each communication infrastructure;
• Packet loss / missing data - the possibility of packet drop
in each communication infrastructure.
Here we introduce a method to deal with the first two
properties that can be employed in the analytic vulnerability
assessment. Another two properties of communication net-
works, latency and packet loss, could also be incorporated into
analytic framework, not for vulnerability assessment but for
combining ICT-specific measures and system-theoretic mea-
sures. We show such potentials in Section V. Let us consider
a simple communication network as shown in Figure 2. We
can describe it as an undirected graph G = (V,E) where V
is the set of nodes and E is the set of communication links.
N1 N2
L1
L2
L3
P1
N3
N4
Figure 2. A simple communication network for illustration of routing
path. N1,N2,N3,N4 represent communication nodes and L1,L2,L3 represent
communication links. The routing path P1 follows N1−L1−N2−L3−N4.
Assuming that a measurement i would be transmitted through
a routing path P1, we establish a binary vector called routing
vector,
ri,P1 = [rTvi,P1,r
T
ei,P1], (3)
where in routing vector rvi,P1 ∈ {0,1}N denotes the part
corresponding to nodes and the entries are equal to 1 if
the route traverses the node. rei,P1 ∈ {0,1}E denotes the part
corresponding to communication links and the entries are
equal to 1 if the route traverses the link. N and E denote
the whole number of nodes and edges in the graph. Thus for
the path P1, we can obtain
rvi,P1 = [1,1,0,1]T ,rei,P1 = [1,0,1]T . (4)
Using the graph of the communication network and routing
schemes for all the measurements, we can build a routing
matrix and each row of the matrix is a routing vector. The
routing matrix and routing vectors contain the information of
communication topology and routing schemes. In our recent
work [6], we extend the vulnerability assessment problem (2)
to the following one,
β j := min
c,d,x,y
‖x‖0+‖y‖0
s.t. a = H0c, (5a)
H0 = (I−diag(d))H, (5b)
a( j) = µ, (5c)
a(i) = 0 if rvi,P = 0, for all i 6= j,P, (5d)
d(i)≤ rvi,Px+ rei,Py for all i 6= j,P, (5e)
d,x,y are all binary vectors,
where x ∈ {0,1}N and y ∈ {0,1}E are vectors whose entries
are 1 if certain nodes/links are attacked. The constraints (5d)
and (5e) use the routing vectors to map the data attacks on
measurements to attacks on communication network. They
also indicate that for FDI attack on measurement j, at least
one node should be attacked and included on all of its routing
paths and for availability attack on measurement j, at least one
node or communication link should be attacked and included
on all of its routing paths. This is the worst-case scenario
that the attacker is assumed to have the knowledge of both
communication network (topology and routing schemes) and
power system network (the network model H). The metric
β j can illustrate the vulnerability of EMS to data attacks on
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Figure 3. Co-simulation diagram.
the communication network. It should be noted that some ICT-
specific security measures can be modeled in (5). For instance,
multi-path routing schemes can be described using routing
vectors in constraints (5d) and (5e). Data authentication can be
implemented by adding constraints to indicate which measure-
ment originates from the node with authentication is protected.
These two analytic vulnerability assessment problems (2)
and (5) can be formulated as mixed integer linear program-
ming (MILP) problems. Further details on formulations and
solutions can be found in [6]. However, these security metrics
do not consider the attack impact on the physical system
operation. In fact, data attacks with the same security metrics
could have considerable different impact. Co-simulation could
offer the capabilities to look into the attack impact and provide
empirical results to validate and contribute in developing
mitigation measures, as discussed in Section II-B.
IV. CO-SIMULATION SUPPORTING VULNERABILITY
ASSESSMENT AND SECURITY ANALYSIS
A. Co-simulation Tools
An integrated environment including simulators of power
system, communication network and EMS applications is
needed for security analysis. In order to allow for real-time
analysis of cyber attacks, the co-simulation platform is im-
plemented with three tools: DIgSILENT PowerFactory for the
power system, OMNeT++ for the communication network, and
Matlab/Matpower for the EMS algorithms. They are coupled
as shown in Figure 3. Here, measurements of the power flow
going in and out of each bus of the power system simulated
in PowerFactory are sent to the EMS applications in Matlab
through a communication network simulated in OMNeT++.
1) Power system simulator: DIgSILENT PowerFactory is
used to conduct a quasi-static power flow simulation. Power-
Factory’s Python API is used to create a script that controls
the execution of the simulation. The same script implements
the interface with OMNeT++. Real time execution is achieved
by synchronizing the power flow calculations with the system
clock. The script sends measurements to OMNeT++ every
fixed time (set to be 5 seconds), but it can expect generator set
points at any time. Thus, a dedicated thread that received set
points and sets them in the power system model is required.
Figure 4. Test communication network of 14 bus system in OMNeT++.
This thread sets the generators according to the set points as
soon as they arrive, unless a power flow calculation is being
executed, in which case it waits for the calculation to finish.
2) Communication Network Simulator: OMNeT++ is used
for discrete-event based communication network simulation.
The communication model in OMNeT++ is shown in Fig-
ure 4. A custom OMNeT++ scheduler is built to enable data
exchange with PowerFactory and Matlab over TCP/IP sockets
and run the OMNeT in real-time. In Figure 4, RTU is a
module served by the scheduler and acts as a RTU proxy.
The second module developed called MTU works as master
unit and data concentrator that receives packets and has a FIFO
queue. There is a Modem module that acts as a communication
bridge and a Router module with routing table for the packets.
Thus, the RTU, Modem and Router represent the LAN (local
area network) of a substation. Besides, the module EMSInput
and EMSInout provide measurements to EMS and receive set
points from EMS in Matlab respectively. For the message
implementation, a new packet class MeasurePacket is derived
to contain the measurement data and be used by all the
modules and scheduler. There are two kinds of communication
channels: channel of the LAN and channel of the WAN (wide
area network) between routers. Different latency and packet
loss probability parameters are set in these two channels. It
should be noted that implementation of a real SCADA system
with protocols (e.g., IEC61850, DNP3.0) and hierarchical
network structure that is close to reality in OMNeT++ is not
our focus in this paper. Instead we try to explore how co-
simulation can support the analytic vulnerability assessment.
3) EMS algorithm: Matpower has been used to simulate
the EMS applications in Matlab, including state estimation
(with bad data detection) and optimal power flow algorithms.
A script is implemented to exchange data with OMNeT++
scheduler over TCP/IP sockets and store measurements into
a data pool. The State Estimation module uses the latest
measurements from data pool to create a snapshot of estimated
power flow. For every fixed time (set to be 30 seconds), the
Optimal Power Flow module uses load estimates from State
Estimation to perform optimal power flow calculation (also
see Figure 1) and sends commands of generator set points to
PowerFactory through OMNeT++.
B. Simulation Integration
Data is exchanged between PowerFactory, OMNeT++ and
Matlab via TCP/IP sockets using the ASN.1 protocol. On the
PowerFactory side, this is implemented in the Python script
that controls the simulator execution, while on the OMNeT++
side, this is implemented through a custom scheduler which
adapted part of the work from [7]. This scheduler act as
the “master” to coordinate the co-simulation, handle the data
exchanges with PowerFactory and Matlab, and also run the
OMNeT++ in a real-time mode. For the synchronization, all
simulators would be started from a command after initializa-
tion and tagged with time stamps with the system clock.
C. Modeling attacks in OMNeT++
An attacker can manipulate the measurements by injecting
false data, making it unavailable or both. After accessing a
router, the attacker can launch data integrity and availability
attacks on all the data traveling through it by executing a man-
in-the-middle attack. By jamming, DoS or physical attack,
the attacker can block measurements in communication links.
In this paper, we consider the worst case scenario that the
attacker is intelligent enough with full knowledge of both
the power system and communication network. The attacker
would use the combined attack policy in (5), i.e., try to remain
hidden from the BDD and manipulate the minimum number
of routers. Then the corrupted measurement vector becomes
za = (I−diag(d))z+a, (6)
where a = (I− diag(d))Hc and d denote the FDI attack and
availability attack respectively. The results from the analytic
work in (5) is used to choose the routers to be attacked. These
attacks is implemented in OMNeT++ by changing the behavior
of the router in case it is accessed by the attacker.
V. SIMULATION RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
We consider the IEEE 14 bus system in Figure 5 to perform
the security analysis. Mapping with Figure 5, the communica-
tion network as depicted in Figure 4 is used. The modeling of
the communication network of IEEE 14 bus system is adapted
from [17]. There are ten substations (each circle represents a
substation in Figure 5) and the control center with MTU and
EMS is located at the reference bus (i.e., Bus 1). There is an
RTU, a modem and a router in each substation. The packets
containing the measurements data would be routed through
multiple routers before reaching MTU. We use the single-path
routing scheme for each measurement.
The case of combined integrity and availability attack in
Section IV-C has been implemented. The analytic results of
(5) can be found in [6]. It shows the minimum number of
routers and links to be attacked in order to corrupt specific
measurements and keep stealth. According to the analytic
Figure 5. IEEE 14 bus system. There are 2 generators. Bus 1 with Generator
1 is the reference/slack bus. Generator 2 is in Bus 2. The power flow
measurements are collected in each bus and both sides of the branch.
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Figure 6. Attack impact of stealth attacks on generation profile of Generator
1 and 2. The per-unit system is used and the power base is 100MW . The
true power flow measurements are generated by DC power flow model with
Gaussian noise (σi = 0.005 for all the measurements). Before the attack
occurrence, the system is operating under the optimal power flow status giving
the loads. In these two cases, the same number of measurements are corrupted.
results, Router 4 (the backbone router) and Router 1 (marked
with a red circle) are the most vulnerable network components.
Thus we change the behavior of Router 4 and Router 1
independently to simulate the attack scenarios once an attacker
gains access to their internals and the packets traveling through
it. Figure 6 shows the attack impact on the generation profile
of generators in Bus 1 and Bus 2. Figure 7 shows the attack
impact on the active power flows when Router 1 is attacked.
As shown in Figure 6, when Router 1 is attacked, the system
“fakes” that the generation profile changes according to the
set points. The generation of Generator 2 has decreased and
Generator 1 should compensate. The “latency” between the
attack occurrence and the change of generation profile is due
to that the EMS sends out set points every 30 seconds. After
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Figure 7. Attack impact of stealth attacks on active power flows in the lines of
bus 1 to 2, bus 1 to 5, bus 2 to 4, and bus 4 to 5. Router 1 is manipulated. The
active power flows are normalized to the ones before the attack occurrence.
the attack occurs, the generation profiles remain almost the
same although the attack continues, which means the attack
impact mainly depends on the initial attack magnitudes and
measurements that are corrupted. When Router 4 is attacked,
however, it seems that there is no attack impact on the
generation profile, though Router 4 is the backbone router
with the most number of packets traveling through. This is
mainly because of the packets in or traveling through these
two routers containing different measurements. According to
our single path routing scheme, in Router 1, the attacker can
gain access to the power flow measurements on bus 2, 3 and
4, which has the major impact on the generation profiles of
these two generators. For the case that Router 1 is attacked,
the active power flows on the lines close to the generators
are shown in Figure 7. The power flows get changed after
redispatch according to the corrupted set points. Such physical
impact can be utilized by the attacker to cause line overflows.
Discussion on Combining Theoretic and ICT-specific Measures
The proposed analytic vulnerability assessment method can
be used to narrow down the attack scenarios. Using the co-
simulation platform, the attack impact can be explored by
directly simulating attacks. New security metrics could be
formulated taking into account the impact of the data attack.
As discussed in Section II-B, co-simulation supports se-
curity analysis in combining the system-theoretic and ICT-
specific measures. In the case of data attacks against EMS,
the BDD scheme acts as a theoretic measure to detect bad
data. However, it fails to trigger alarms when we simulate
attacks on Router 1 and Router 4 since the measurements
still fulfill the physical laws. To make it robust against data
attacks, the communication network properties supported by
co-simulation show the potentials for developing an advanced
BDD scheme. For instance, when FDI attacks take place, the
latency of attacked packets changes due to the attack process.
When availability attacks occur, the latency of attacked packets
can be treated as an extreme case. Thus a robust BDD scheme
could be developed against combined attacks, incorporating
network properties with the latency of packets measured in
the co-simulation platform. We leave this for future work.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we contribute to extend analytic methods
incorporating communication network properties and develop
a co-simulation platform to analyze data attacks against EMS.
The results shows the need to consider the vulnerability and
attack impact in an integrated assessment framework and
combine the system theoretic and ICT-specific measures to
protect EMS. Our future work includes more security analysis
on AC power flow model and other EMS applications using
the co-simulation platform, developing robust algorithms for
detection and mitigation measures, etc.
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